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Abstract 
Assume it is known that one player in a 2 2 game can detect the strategy choice 
of its opponent with some probability before play commences.  We formulate conditions 
under which the detector can, by credibly committing to a strategy of probabilistic tit-for-
tat (based on its imperfect detector), induce an outcome favorable to itself.   A non-Nash, 
Pareto-optimal outcome is inducible—that is, it can be stabilized via probabilistic tit-for-
tat—in 20 of the 57 distinct 2 2 strict ordinal games without a mutually best outcome 
(35 percent).  Sometimes the inducement is “weak,” but more often it is “strong.”  As a 
case study, we consider the current conflict between Israel and Iran over Iran’s possible 
development of nuclear weapons and show that Israel’s credible commitment to 
probabilistic tit-for-tat can, with sufficiently accurate intelligence, induce a cooperative 
choice by Iran in one but not the other of two plausible games that model this conflict.  
 3 
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes1  
1.  Introduction 
A generation ago Axelrod (1984) argued that tit-for-tat—“I’ll cooperate if you do; 
otherwise, I won’t”—is a robust strategy for inducing cooperation in repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma (PD) games with an uncertain end.  Among his findings were that tit-for-tat 
defeated all other strategies proposed in two tournaments.  Laboratory experiments of 
repeated PD conducted over several decades have shown that tit-for-tat often induces 
cooperation, even though players have strictly dominant strategies of not cooperating in 
any single play.  In addition, tit-for-tat seems to explain how cooperation emerges in 
several real-life situations.   
But there have been numerous criticisms of Axelrod’s conclusions.  Some, for 
example, have argued that tit-for-tat is brittle strategy, because if players switch to 
defection if an opponent defects, then they will be locked into defection until the end of 
play.  By contrast, a delayed or more forgiving strategy (e.g., defect only if an opponent 
defects twice in a row, or probabilistic forms of tit-for-tat that render it more generous) 
avoids this problem and better allows for mistakes (Molander, 1985).  Other critics have 
pointed out that still different strategies, including those that allow for mutations and 
different kinds of reciprocity in an evolutionary setting, frequently work better (Nowak, 
2006, 2011; Sigmund, 2010).  On one matter, however, there is a consensus: No strategy 
is optimal in all situations, which in our view leaves all prescriptions about how to act in 
repeated PD suspect. 
                                                 
1 We thank Bryan Bruns for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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In this paper, we do not propose a new strategy for repeated PD or any other 
specific games, nor do we analyze the dynamics of the evolution of cooperation using 
evolutionary game theory.  Instead, we ask whether tit-for-tat can be put into a 
simultaneous-choice framework (repeated play and evolutionary game theory assume 
sequential play), wherein one player has imperfect, or probabilistic, information about its 
opponent’s action in advance.  In the single play of a game, this player commits to 
choosing its strategy based on this imperfect information.  The opponent is aware of this 
commitment, regards it as credible, and responds rationally to it. 
We apply this framework to all 2 2 games of conflict, of which PD is just one.2  
We identify in which games this commitment, if believed, can induce an outcome 
favorable to the detecting player if its detector is sufficiently accurate. 
We note that it is common for players to make pledges about the actions they 
intend to take.  For instance, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) was 
essentially a reciprocal pledge by the two superpowers to abide by tit-for-tat, which was 
effective in preventing nuclear war over the nearly 50-year history of the Cold War.  
In the current model, only one player makes a commitment, though it does not 
matter which one if the game is symmetric, like PD.  As we will show, this commitment 
undercuts the dominance of noncooperation in one-shot PD, rendering cooperation on the 
part of both players—in order to maximize their expected payoffs— optimal, given that 
the detector’s probability of correct detection is sufficiently high. 
                                                 
2 PD is one of exactly 78 distinct 2 2 strict ordinal games in which two players, each with two strategies, 
can strictly rank the resulting four outcomes from best to worst.  When the 21 games with a mutually best 
outcome are excluded, there remain 57 games, called conflict games, which include PD. There has been 
considerable recent work on classifying 2 2 strict ordinal games and understanding their topology.  See 
Robinson and Goforth (2005), Bruns (2011), and citations therein.   
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To be sure, giving the detector prior knowledge and the ability to make a credible 
commitment alters the structure of the classic PD.  But the point of our analysis is to 
show that this reformulation, which we consider realistic, can lead the players to a 
preferred outcome (mutual cooperation), in PD and other games, that otherwise would 
elude them because it is unstable. 
During the Cold War, each superpower assiduously sought to acquire information 
about the likely strategy choice of its opponent.  A state’s intelligence is typically 
assembled from a variety of sources, including the interception of electronic signals 
(possibly through computer hacking), observations from manned or unmanned 
overflights, satellite reconnaissance, and human informers and spies.   Unsurprisingly, 
improvements in the ability to ferret out information about an opponent’s plans have led 
to corresponding improvements in the ability to conceal or manipulate this information, 
so what is gleaned from sophisticated intelligence operations today may be no more 
accurate or reliable than when espionage relied solely on human intelligence.   
There is no denying the enormous resources now devoted to intelligence.  Since 
the early 1960s, the most significant improvement in the detection capabilities of states 
has come from the use of reconnaissance satellites, which were first deployed by the 
superpowers but are now widely used.  President Lyndon Johnson claimed that space 
reconnaissance had saved enough in military expenditures to pay for all other military 
and space programs (Biddle, 1972).  President Jimmy Carter, in the first public 
acknowledgment of photo reconnaissance satellites, said that “in the monitoring of arms 
control agreements, they make an immense contribution to the security of all nations” 
(Chicago Tribune, October 2, 1978, p. 2). 
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Although intelligence is not always accurate, a maxim of intelligence agencies is 
that some information, even if imperfect, is better than none.  We do not address the 
problem of acquiring high-quality information but ask, instead, when and how less-than-
perfect information can be used to advantage by players trying to influence the behavior 
of opponents. 
In this paper, we suppose that one player (the detector) can detect with some 
probability the strategy choice of its opponent.  Probabilistic tit-for-tat is a pledge by the 
detector (the inducer) to cooperate if and only if it detects that its opponent (the inducee) 
also cooperates.  
We assume throughout that the resulting cooperative outcome is not a Nash 
equilibrium.3  If it were, it could be induced by the inducer’s commitment to choose a 
particular strategy (with certainty), rather than a contingent commitment based on what it 
detects.  Our goal is to identify those games in which probabilistic tit-for-tat is critical in 
stabilizing a non-Nash cooperative outcome.   
Our main finding is that probabilistic tit-for-tat can induce a favorable outcome—
better for the detector than any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium—in 20 of the 57 conflict 
games (35 percent).  We call games in which tit-for-tat can induce such an outcome 
inducible games.  
                                                 
3 Technically, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies, associated with an outcome, from which neither 
player would unilaterally depart because it would not benefit by doing so.  But because each outcome in a 
strict ordinal game is associated with a unique pair of strategies, these outcomes can be used to define 
strategy pairs that are in equilibrium.  We consider in this paper only pure-strategy Nash equilibria, but we 
note that sometimes it is possible for mixed-strategy equilibria to be perturbed slightly to induce certain 
outcomes (Brams and Kilgour, 1988). 
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While the inducer, by committing to probabilistic tit-for-tat, renders it rational for 
the inducee to choose its cooperative strategy,4 the inducer’s information may be 
inaccurate.  Hence, it may not always be rational for the inducer to choose cooperation 
when it detects that the inducee will cooperate.  
But if the inducer’s detector is sufficiently accurate, it benefits from inducing 
cooperation, via probabilistic tit-for-tat, in inducible games.   For the inducee, these 
include games in which it obtains a rather poor (i.e., next-worst) outcome, though in most 
inducible games the inducee does better (i.e., obtains a next-best outcome) than it would 
at a Nash equilibrium. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we describe our model of 
inducement.  In section 3 we specify the calculus of the inducee, which we assume to be 
Row, and in section 4 the calculus of the inducer (Column).  These specifications, which 
are conditions on the game being played, allow for three payoff configurations for Row, 
and eight for Column, producing 24 potentially inducible games (two of them are the 
same game, with the inducer and inducee interchanging roles). We distinguish weakly 
from strongly inducible games, wherein inducement is more reliant on the quality of the 
detector. 
In section 5 we discard one of the duplicative games, and three others, because 
they have Nash equilibria that Column (the inducer) prefers to the inducible outcome. In 
these games, the inducer can effect a Nash equilibrium by a commitment strategy simpler 
that probabilistic tit-for-tat.  This leaves 20 inducible games, in which the cooperative 
outcome that Column can induce benefits it and, usually to a lesser extent, Row.   
                                                 
4 Although the strategy “cooperate” is well defined in PD, it is not always clear what it means in other 
games, which is why we associate it with a favorable outcome for the inducer.  As we will see, it may be 
either a next-best or next-worst outcome for the inducee. 
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In section 6 we apply our analysis to international relations, focusing on the 
current conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran’s possible development of nuclear 
weapons and Israel’s choice of attacking or not attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.  We 
summarize our analysis, and draw several conclusions, in section 7.  
2.  Imperfect Detection and Probabilistic Tit-for-Tat 
Assume Row and Column play a 2 2 game, depicted in Figure 1, wherein each 
player can choose either to cooperate (C) or defect (D).  Assume further that Column has 
a detector, which signals the choice that Row is about to make (CR or DR).   
The probability that the detector gives a correct (accurate) signal depends on 
whether Row intends to choose CR or DR.  We define the quality of the detector as two 
conditional probabilities, 
p = Pr {detector signals CR | Row chooses CR} 
q = Pr {detector signals DR | Row chooses DR}, 
where p and q are parameters satisfying 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1.   
Figure 1 about here 
We assume the values of p and q are common knowledge: Each player knows these 
values, knows that the other player knows them, knows that this knowledge is known, ad 
infinitum.5  However, only Column acts on the basis of the signal it receives; Row acts on 
                                                 
5 Such common knowledge might be acquired by Column’s demonstration of the quality of its detection 
equipment to Row.  In a related model of arms-control inspection, putting an inspectee “on notice” via such 
a prior move can induce greater cooperation on the part of the inspectee (Brams and Kilgour, 1992).  Of 
course, in other situations an inspector may wish to hide its ability to detect the choice of an opponent, lest 
the opponent take countermeasures to conceal its choices.  In section 5 we show that there are a few games 
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the presumption that Column chooses its action according to its commitment.  For 
example, if Row chooses CR, then Column’s choice will depend on whether the detector 
signals CR (with probability p) or DR (with probability 1−p).  
Our model of the detection process is quite general.  It might involve specific, 
fixed values of p and q.  Alternatively, Column might be faced with a so-called 
characteristic curve q = f(p) such that, for each value of p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the greatest value of 
q that can be achieved is f(p).  Column chooses a value of p, say p0, and then uses the 
detector with characteristic (p0, f(p0)).  It is usually assumed that f(0) = 1, f(1) = 0, f(p) > p 
for 0 < p < 1, and f(p) is strictly decreasing in p.6  A typical characteristic curve is shown 
in Figure 2.  Note that the point (p*, p*) is the point where the curve crosses the 45-
degree line defined by p = q; at all other points of the curve, q is either less than or 
greater than p.  The distance of  (p*, p*) from (1, 1) is a measure of the degree of 
imperfection of the detector.   
Figure 2 about here 
How should Column use its detector in the play of a 2 2 game?  We assume that 
it conditions its choice, C or D,7 on the signal that it receives from its detector.  More 
specifically, if Column wishes to induce CC8—subject to the limitations of its detector—
it will respond to Row’s (apparent) choice of C with C, and Row’s (apparent) choice of D 
with D.   
                                                                                                                                                 
in which, after Row chooses to cooperate, either Column or Row can benefit when Column misdetects 
Row’s choice and chooses not to cooperate.   
6 See Lindgren (1976).  For an application to arms races, see Brams, Davis, and Straffin (1979a, 1979b) 
and Dacey (1979). 
7 We drop the subscript of the player (C or R) that chooses a strategy when its identity is clear from the 
context. 
8 When a strategy pair XY is used to identify an outcome, X is Row’s strategy and Y is Column’s strategy. 
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When Row chooses C and Column incorrectly detects D, which occurs with 
probability 1–p, a type 1 error (a false negative) occurs; when Row chooses D and 
Column incorrectly detects C, which occurs with probability 1–q, the error is of type 2 (a 
false positive).  How damaging each type of error is will depend on the situation, which 
we will say more about later.  
Henceforth, we assume that Column credibly commits to probabilistic tit-for-tat, 
pledging that “I’ll cooperate if I detect that you will cooperate; otherwise, I won’t.”  Our 
objective is to identify the 2 2 games in which there is a cooperative outcome (CC), 
which is not stable on it own (i.e., is not Nash).  But it can be stabilized by probabilistic 
tit-for-tat, providing the detector is good enough (even if less than perfect).  Among other 
things, we show that CC must be at least as favorable to Column (the inducer) as to Row 
(the inducee).  Whereas CC is always Column’s best or its next-best outcome, it is never 
best for Row and may even be Row’s next-worst outcome. 
3.  Row’s (Inducee’s) Calculus 
We assume that Column can correctly detect Row’s choice of C with probability p; 
similarly, it can correctly detect Row’s choice of D with probability q.  Given that 
Column’s commitment to probabilistic tit-for-tat is credible, Row’s expected payoffs 
from its choices of C and D are as follows:  
ER(C) = pa11 + (1–p)a12 
ER(D) = qa22 + (1–q)a21. 
Row prefers to choose C iff ER(C) ≥ ER(D), which is true iff 
p(a11 – a12) + q(a21 – a22) ≥ a21 – a12.  (1) 
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We call (1) the Inducement Condition for Row and next specify several reasonable 
conditions which, if satisfied, justify the conclusion that the existence of the detector, and 
Column’s credible commitment to rely on it, can induce Row to choose C.  
First, it must be the case that  
 a21 > a11, (R1) 
because otherwise a detector is not necessary—Column can induce Row to choose C 
simply by credibly committing to choose C.  This follows from the fact that if (R1) fails, 
Row—knowing that the outcome will be in the first column if Column commits to C—
will choose C because a11 ≥ a21, obviating the need for detection.   
To understand our second condition, suppose that Row believes that Column’s 
detector works perfectly, so Column will always choose C in response to Row’s choice of 
C, and D in response to Row’s choice of D.   Then, effectively, Row must choose 
between CC and DD.  To induce CC, Row must find it no less preferable than DD, that is  
 a11 ≥ a22, (R2) 
because otherwise Row would prefer that Column actually carry out its threat—choose D 
after detecting D.   
Notice that (R2) is equivalent to the Inducement Condition for Row, (1), in the 
case that p = q = 1.  Thus, if (R2) holds, inducement always succeeds if the detector is 
perfect.  
Our third condition, which we call inducibility, is roughly that inducement depends 
on the detector’s being good enough.  This condition allows for inducement when the 
detector is less than perfect.   
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We distinguish two kinds of inducibility:   
1.  Inducement is weak when it fails for the poorest possible detector, which is one 
with (p, q) = (0, 0).   
2.  Inducement is strong if, when it works for some detector, then it also works for 
any detector that is an improvement on the first.   
Improving a detector means increasing its values of p, q, or both.  Thus, for strong 
inducibility, we require that if a detector works for a detector with characteristic (p, q), 
then it also works for a detector with characteristic (p', q'), provided that p' ≥ p and q' ≥ q.     
We show in the Appendix that a necessary condition for weak inducibility is  
 a12  < a21, (R3) 
and a necessary condition for strong inducibility is   
 a12 ≤ a11. (R4) 
For 2
€ 
×2 strict ordinal games, assumptions (R1) and (R2) imply that a22 < a11 < a21.  
Because Row’s payoff, a12, can be inserted at any point in this ordering, there are four 
possible strict orderings for Row:  
(a) a12 < a22 < a11  < a21. 
(b) a22 < a12 < a11  < a21. 
(c) a22 < a11 < a12  < a21. 
(d) a22 < a11 < a21  < a12. 
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These four orderings can be conveniently described by setting the utilities of Row’s best, 
next best, next worst, and worst outcomes equal to 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, which 
correspond to (a) a12 = 1, (b) a12 = 2, (c) a12 = 3, and (d) a12 = 4.  Note that (R3) holds in 
cases (a), (b), and (c), whereas (R4) holds only in cases (a) and (b).  Thus, cases (a) and 
(b) are strongly (and also weakly) inducible, whereas case (c) is weakly but not strongly 
inducible, and case (d) is not inducible.  
The shaded regions in the (p, q) unit squares of Figure 3 show the 
characteristics of all detectors for which the Inducement Condition for Row, (1), 
holds.  These regions, separated by straight lines from the noninducibility 
(unshaded) regions, are calculated as if the aforementioned ordinal values (4, 3, 2, 
1) were cardinal.   
Figure 3 about here 
In the Appendix, we draw a distinction between the strongly inducible games 
described by Figures 3(a) and 3(b).  Assume a detector has a characteristic curve of the 
kind shown in Figure 2.  Then Column can choose a detector characteristic, (p0, f(p0)), 
that satisfies the Inducement Condition for Row, (1), in Figure 3(b), whereas this 
condition may fail in Figure 3(a) for all possible detectors.  We say that strong 
inducement is guaranteed in Figure 3(b) but not in Figure 3(a); for details, see the 
Appendix.  
4.  Column’s (Inducer’s) Calculus and 24 Potentially Inducible Games 
Having determined the conditions under which Row can be induced to choose C 
when Column uses an imperfect detector and makes a credible commitment to 
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probabilistic tit-for-tat, we next inquire under what conditions this commitment would 
benefit Column as inducer.   
If Column’s detector were perfect, recall from section 3 that it offers, in effect, 
Row the choice between CC and DD.  If Column wishes to induce CC, then it must 
weakly prefer it to DD:   
 b11 ≥ b22. (C1) 
In the presence of (R2), this means that CC is Pareto-superior to DD—both Column and 
Row agree that CC is preferable to DD.  
Now assume that conditions (R1) – (R3) hold so that, as noted earlier, a21 is Row’s 
best payoff.   If it were the case that b21 ≥ b11, then DC would be a Nash equilibrium, and 
would be preferred by both players to CC.  In such a case, it would make no sense for 
Column to try to induce DC.  We therefore require that   
 b11 > b21, (C2) 
a condition that implies that the two players have opposite preferences for CC and DC—
Column prefers CC, Row DC—which is precisely why a sufficiently good detector is 
needed to induce CC via tit-for-tat.  
  In section 3, we noted that there are three configurations of Row’s payoffs – 
denoted (a), (b), and (c) – that are consistent with (R1) – (R3).  It is easy to verify that 
eight configurations of Column’s payoffs are consistent with conditions (C1) and (C2) 
(see Figure 4).  It follows that 8 3 = 24 games, shown in Figure 4, satisfy all these 
conditions.  As noted in Figure 4, one-third of these games are weakly but not strongly 
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inducible, whereas the rest are both weakly and strongly inducible.  But, we caution, the 
24 games are only “potentially” inducible, for reasons we will discuss in section 5.  
Figure 4 about here 
Recall from section 1 (ftn. 2) that there are 57 2 2 conflict games (for a complete 
listing, see the Appendices in Brams, 1994, 2011).  Each of the listed games is equivalent 
to up to seven others, obtained by interchanging the players and/or their column or row 
strategies.  
In fact, 23 of the 24 games in Figure 4 are not equivalent in this sense, making 
them truly distinct.  However, #24i (‘i’ is for interchange) is not distinct:  It is the mirror 
image of #24 (also potentially inducible), which is obtained by interchanging Row and 
Column in #24.   
Thus, either player can induce CC in #24.  Also worth noting is that two of the 
potentially inducible games in Figure 4, PD (#32) and Chicken (#57), are symmetric, so 
the strategic problems faced by their players are identical.  Hence, in these games as well, 
either player can induce CC.  
5.  20 Inducible Games 
In four of the 24 games in Figure 4, Column will not in fact be motivated to induce 
CC, because there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that Column prefers to CC.  
Because Column can effect these equilibria by credibly committing to choosing its 
strategy associated with them, it gains no benefit in committing to tit-for-tat and relying 
on an imperfect detector.  
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We, therefore, remove these four games (#20, #22, #53, and #57) from the list of 
24.  In two of them (#20 and #53), the outcome that Column can induce with a detector, 
(2,3), is in fact Pareto-inferior to the Nash equilibrium (3,4)— worse for both Column 
and Row.  In game #53, there is a second Nash equilibrium, (4,2), which Row prefers to 
(3,4) and could, therefore, effect by credibly committing to its strategy of D.    
In Chicken (#57), either player can stabilize CC, using probabilistic tit-for-tat.  But 
this game has two equilibria, each preferred by one player, so again there is the potential 
for a clash of commitments.   
Eliminating the four aforementioned games from the potentially inducible games 
in Figure 4, we focus on the 2 2 conflict games in which there is an unstable CC 
outcome that can be stabilized using probabilistic tit-for-tat.  In Figure 5, we classify 
these 20 inducible games into five classes, depending on their properties.   
Figure 5 about here 
Perhaps surprisingly, inducible games have a substantial overlap with the class of  
difficult games identified by Brams and Kilgour (2009); see also Brams (2011, ch. 5).  In 
these games, CC is the unique outcome that is either best (4) or next best (3) for each 
player, is Pareto-superior to DD, but is not a Nash equilibrium.  Brams and Kilgour 
(2009) showed that in a difficult game CC can be stabilized by a process tied to voting.   
The difficult games can be viewed as a class that generalizes both Prisoners’ 
Dilemma and Chicken.  Remarkably, all 11 difficult games are potentially inducible; only 
Chicken is not inducible. 
The classification shown in Figure 5 extends the classification of difficult games 
suggested by Brams and Kilgour (2009), which reflects their Nash equilibrium properties.   
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The 10 difficult games that are inducible fall into classes 1, 2, and 3 below.  The 
complete classification is as follows: 
1. The game is difficult and the  DD outcome is a Nash equilibrium (4 games). 
2. The game is difficult and there is a Nash equilibrium, but it is neither CC nor 
DD (3 games). 
3. The game is difficult and there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (3 
games). 
4. The game is not difficult, and the CC outcome is next-best for Row (4 games). 
5.  The game is not difficult, and the CC outcome is next-worst for Row (6 
games). 
It might seem a misnomer to call the (2,4) outcomes in the class 5 games 
“cooperative.”  In fact, these are exactly the six weakly inducible games.  In contrast to 
the 14 strongly inducible games, wherein Row (the inducee) receives its next-best payoff 
(3) at CC, Row does relatively poorly in the class 5 games by receiving its next-worst 
outcome.  Indeed, when Column misdetects and chooses D in these games, Row actually 
does better, obtaining its next-best payoff (3), a point we will return to later. 
Of the 20 inducible games in Figure 5, only in games #3 (PD) and #5 is CC the 
next-best outcome for both players. In the 18 other inducible games, Column obtains its 
best outcome (4) and Row does not, suggesting that the inducer tends to do better.9  
Our inducibility condition shows that inducement fails for a poor detector but 
succeeds for a good enough detector.  A rough measure of how good a detector must be 
                                                 
9 This statement is based on the comparative ranks of players, not on an interpersonal comparison of their 
utilities.  It seems reasonable to claim that a player does better than its opponent when it obtains its best 
outcome and its opponent does not. 
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can be obtained from the threshold probability for Row, p0, which is the least value of p 
such that (p, p) is within the inducement region.  This calculation assumes that p = q.10   
In Figure 3, the value p = p0 defines the point where the 45-degree line enters the 
inducement region.  By setting q = p in (1), it is easy to verify that   
.  (2) 
For a detector with characteristic on the 45-degree line, Row will be willing to choose C 
rather than D if and only if p ≥ p0.  Because we are assuming (R2), it can be shown from 
(2) that 0 < p0 < 1 if and only if (R3) holds – that is, if and only if the game is weakly 
inducible.  
To see the significance of the threshold value, p0, suppose that the characteristic of 
a detector is known.  If the value p* defined earlier (see Figure 2) satisfies p* > p0, then 
the detector is good enough for inducement.11  Of course, this threshold probability p0—
above which Column can induce Row to choose C, rendering CC possible if not likely—
is calculated by assuming that the players’ ordinal rankings for outcomes are cardinal 
utilities.   
For specific inducible games, actual values of p0 may be quite different from those 
shown in Figure 5.  To illustrate, assume in game 9 that Row’s cardinalization is 10, 9, 8, 
1, so its worst payoff is far below its three others.  Then applying (3), p0 = 1/5, so even 
                                                 
10 In the context of international relations, we discuss in section 6 when this assumption might be 
applicable and when not. 
11 The converse of this statement is false.  Nonetheless, the value of p0 is a useful measure of how good a 
detector must be for inducement to occur.  
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poor predictions by Column can still make it rational for Row to choose C, thereby 
precluding its worst outcome. 
Paradoxically, in two of the inducible games, #3 (PD) and #5, in both of which CC 
yields (3,3), it is in Column’s interest that p be greater than p0—but not by much.  In each 
game, Column benefits by misdetecting Row’s choice of C on occasion, giving Column 
an “excuse” to choose D and thereby obtain its best outcome of (1,4).  In these two 
inducible games, and only in these two, better predictions—above the threshold value of 
p0—are not in Column’s interest, whereas Row suffers its worst outcome when Column’s 
detector fails and incorrectly signals Row’s choice of D.  In the more general formulation 
with detector characteristic (p, q), as defined in section 2, increases in p, beyond the 
minimum, are not in Column’s interest.  
Curiously, it is Row that benefits in the six class 5 games when Column’s detector 
fails.  In these games, Row obtains a payoff of 3 at CD instead of 2 at CC, whereas 
Column always does best (4) at CC.  In these games, too, the players have opposite 
interests in the quality of detection, given that Column’s detection probability is 
sufficient to induce Row to choose C. 
These “opposite interests” of players in certain games, while anomalous, should 
not detract from our main result—namely, that in more than 1/3 of the 2 2 conflict 
games, Column can induce Row to make a choice favorable to Column.  To the degree 
that Column’s detector is accurate, this leads to an outcome that would otherwise be 
unstable.  In section 6, we explore the implications of these results in international 
relations, using them to illuminate the strategic situation of Iran and Israel regarding 
Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons.  
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6.  Tit-for-Tat in International Relations12 
In the international arena, tit-for-tat depends on a state’s (i) having intelligence on 
the probabilities of an opponent’s choices, (ii) communicating to the opponent its 
intention to act according to this intelligence, and (iii) being believed by the opponent.  
The use of tit-for-tat presumes that a player not only can learn what its opponent is about 
to do but also can influence that opponent’s choice, benefiting itself in the process.  Our 
calculations demonstrate that in 20 of the 2  2 conflict games, the opponent can be 
induced to cooperate if the inducers’s detection probability is sufficiently high, and this 
probability is known by both players.   
For an opponent to respond cooperatively, however, requires that it believe the 
detector will follow tit-for-tat and do what its detector tells it to do, even though this 
might not be the detector’s optimal strategy after inducement occurs.  For this reason, the 
detector’s reputation for keeping its word is crucial for probabilistic tit-for-tat to work.  
As a case in point, consider the current conflict between Iran and Israel over the 
suspicions of Israel, as well as other countries and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, that Iran is enriching uranium in order to develop nuclear weapons that could be 
used against Israel.  Iran denies this intent, despite the discovery of previously hidden 
nuclear facilities and the uncovering of other deceptions; it claims, rather, that it desires 
to enrich uranium only as an alternative energy source to be used for civilian purposes. 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have threatened to 
attack Iran and destroy its nuclear capability unless there is proof, based on a rigorous 
                                                 
12 We thank Etel Solingen for valuable comments on an earlier version of this section.  Her chapters on 
Iran and Israel in Solingen (2007) offer background on the past calculations of these countries’ leaders 
about the acquisition of nuclear weapons.   For more recent information on the effects of threats and 
sanctions on Iran, see Nader (2012). 
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inspection of its suspected nuclear facilities, that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons..  
(Other Israeli leaders have opposed such an attack, arguing that at best it might delay but 
not stop Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.)  At the time of writing (September 2012), 
Israel and Iran are at an impasse, with Iran denying international inspectors access to the 
facilities in question.  
Because of its refusal, Iran has already suffered severe economic sanctions 
imposed by the United States, the European Union, and other countries.  More sanctions 
are scheduled to go into effect.  They all have a tit-for-tat aspect, with the sanctioners 
offering to relax or lift the sanctions if Iran agrees to allow inspections and credibly 
commits to stopping its efforts that could lead to the production of nuclear weapons.  But 
other countries, including China and Russia, have opposed the use of sanctions.  
The most immediate danger of armed conflict arises from Israel’s threat to attack 
Iran’s nuclear-production facilities.  More specifically, Israel’s position is that, failing an 
agreement, it will attack Iran’s facilities before a point of no return—called a “zone of 
immunity” by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak (Landler and Sanger, 2012)—is 
reached, when these facilities become sufficiently hardened (they are inside a mountain) 
to be effectively impregnable.  Whether the United States would actively participate in 
such an attack, or covertly facilitate it, is unclear, but President Barack Obama said on 
March 8, 2012, that the United States “will always have Israel’s back.”       
Israel has never publicly acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, but is widely 
presumed to have them; it has said that it would not be the first party to introduce them 
into a conflict.  Because the present Israeli government avers that Iran’s acquisition of 
nuclear weapons threatens its existence, it seems ready to arrest Iran’s development of 
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them if economic sanctions or covert actions—including assassinations and cyberwarfare, 
which have been carried out already (Bergman, 2012; Bronner, 2112; Erdbrink, 2012)—
do not work.   
Unlike the superpowers during the Cold War, Israel appears unwilling to rely on 
its own nuclear deterrent and MAD, perhaps in part because it fears that terrorists could 
gain control of any nuclear weapons Iran develops.  Israel’s small size makes its survival 
an issue—even if retaliation is possible—whereas Iran’s ability to absorb a retaliatory 
strike is greater, possibly giving it an incentive to preempt with nuclear weapons.  
In the two games shown in Figures 6a and 6b, Iran chooses between developing 
(D) or not developing ( ) nuclear weapons, and Israel chooses between attacking (A) or 
not attacking ( ) Iran’s nuclear facilities.13  Israel’s preferences are the same in the two 
games, whereas Iran’s preferences vary, with Iran’s next-best and next-worst outcomes 
interchanged in the two games. 
Figures 6a and 6b about here 
We assume Israel’s ranking to be  > DA > A > D .  As justification, there 
is little doubt that Israel would most prefer a cooperative solution ( ), in which Iran 
does not develop nuclear weapons so no attack is required, and least prefer that Iran 
develop nuclear weapons without making an effort to stop their production (D ).  
Between attacking weapons that are being developed (DA) and mistakenly attacking 
weapons that are not being developed ( A), we assume that Israel would prefer the 
                                                 
13 Biran and Tauman (2008) analyze a game modeling a similar situation in which there is imperfect 
detection, but they do not distinguish between type 1 and type 2 errors.  They prove several propositions 
relating the detection probability, which may or may not be common knowledge, to different equilibria in 
the game. 
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former (the latter strategy would create a crisis, but it would not be disastrous to Israel’s 
security).  
As for Iran, at least given its present leadership, we assume its most preferred 
outcome is to develop nuclear weapons without being attacked (D ), and its least 
preferred is not to develop nuclear weapons and be attacked anyway ( A).  In between, 
Iran’s preferences are less clear.  In Figure 6a, we assume that Iran prefers the 
cooperative outcome ( ) to the noncooperative outcome (DA), and in Figure 6b we 
assume the reverse.  Thus, the issue is whether Iran prefers to develop weapons and be 
attacked, or neither. 
In both of our games, D is a dominant strategy for Iran, and the unique Nash 
equilibrium is the noncooperative outcome (DA).  Figure 6a is the weakly and strongly 
inducible game #1 (Figure 5), while Figure 6b is not inducible.  In this game, Iran (Row) 
does best (4) or next best (3) by choosing its dominant strategy, D, so it cannot be 
induced to cooperate, independent of the quality of Israel’s detection apparatus. 
By contrast, probabilistic tit-for-tat does induce Iran’s choice of  in game #1 if 
Israel’s detection capability is good enough (assuming the 4, 3, 2, 1 cardinalization of this 
game in Figure 5, the threshold condition is p > p0 =  ¾ if p = q).  But if Iran only barely 
prefers  to DA, so that the gap between a11 and a22 is much smaller than the gap 
between a21 and a12, near-perfect detection would be required.  For example, utilities of 4, 
3, 3.1, 1 produce a threshold of p0 = 0.97.14 
The assumption that p = q (see section 2) may be appropriate in this particular 
case.  If Israel correctly detects that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, it will probably 
                                                 
14 A related question is whether detection of uranium enrichment or actual weaponization, or something in 
between, would constitute a casus belli for Israel. 
 24 
correctly detect when it is not, though proving a “negative” can be difficult.15  To be sure, 
in other situations (e.g., medical testing), the probabilities of type 1 and type 2 errors may 
be designed to be different, but this seems unlikely in international relations when 
intelligence is unbiased.  
As we noted earlier, Iran has not proved inducible so far, at least under the 
pressure of economic sanctions, though this could change.  Whether Iran will be 
persuaded to be more forthcoming as sanctions are increased, or under the threat of 
imminent attack by Israel, may well depend on whether its preferences are closer to those 
in the Figure 6a or Figure 6b game.  But we emphasize that only in the former game can 
Iran be induced to cooperate.   
Even if Israel’s detection probability is greater than the threshold value required 
for tit-for-tat to induce cooperation, there may be complicating factors.  For example, if 
Israel’s detection probability is not common knowledge, as we assumed earlier, Iran may 
believe that Israel’s intelligence capabilities are insufficient to ascertain its development 
of nuclear weapons.  So it may proceed to develop them, mistakenly thinking that its 
efforts will not be detected. 
In summary, we have suggested that the current conflict between Iran and Israel 
over Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons can be represented by two plausible 
games.  In one, Iran cannot be induced to cooperate via probabilistic tit-for-tat, no matter 
how accurate is the intelligence Israel has on its activities, but in the other it can be 
induced if Israel has a sufficiently high probability of correctly detecting Iran’s strategy, 
                                                 
15 So can proving a “positive,” as the United States learned when it incorrectly detected the presence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before it launched its attack in March 2003.  But intelligence in this 
case seems to have been biased by the Bush administration’s extreme antagonism toward Saddam Hussein 
and its desire to depose him. 
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and Iran knows this.  Clearly, the future remains uncertain, but we think our model 
clarifies the basis of this uncertainty. 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
We have shown that unstable (non-Nash) outcomes in 20 of the 57 2 2 games of 
conflict (35 percent) can be stabilized by probabilistic tit-for-tat.  We called these 
outcomes “cooperative,” because they are better for the detector (inducer) than any pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in these games.   
While they are always best (4) or next-best (3) outcomes for the detector (inducer), 
they are either next-best (14 games) or next worst (six games) for the inducee.  But even 
in the latter games (the class 5 games in Figure 5), no other outcome is Pareto-superior to 
the induced outcome.   
In two of these games (#15 and #16), there are Nash equilibria that the inducee 
would prefer.  Moreover, we showed that in a few games, if inducement works and the 
inducee chooses C, either the inducer or the inducee can benefit when the inducer 
misdetects the choice of C and responds with D.    
In the ten difficult inducible games (classes 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 5), a group that 
includes Prisoners’ Dilemma, the cooperative outcome is either best or next best for both 
players, and it is the only such outcome.  In these games, the case is strongest that it is in 
the interest of both players to stabilize this outcome via probabilistic tit-for-tat.   
In any such game, the quality (characteristic) of the detector must fall into the zone 
of inducement (Figure 3).  If this characteristic is a point on a characteristic curve (Figure 
2), the possibility of inducement depends on whether the characteristic curve enters the 
zone of inducement (details are given in the Appendix).  
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Our case study of the Iran-Israel conflict presented two games that plausibly model 
this conflict.  One is both weakly and strongly inducible, whereas the other is not 
inducible.  Time will tell whether this conflict is resolved peaceably; if it is, it seems 
likely that inducible game #1 was the one played, and Israel’s use of probabilistic tit-for-
tat was effective.   
In conclusion, we have provided a version of tit-for-tat that is quite different from 
that used in repeated play or evolutionary game theory.  We think this perspective offers 
new insight into how cooperation can be stabilized in a large number of games wherein it 
is known that one side has the capability, with sufficient accuracy, to detect and respond 
in a tit-for-tat manner to the strategy choice of its opponent.   
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Appendix 
This Appendix shows how the definitions of weak and strong inducibility are 
connected to the conditions (R3) and (R4) utilitized in section 3.  Weak inducement is 
distinguished from strong inducement as follows: 
1.  Inducement is weak when it fails for the poorest possible detector, which is one 
with (p, q) = (0, 0).   
2.  Inducement is strong if, when it works for some detector, then improving the 
detector cannot cause it to fail: If inducement works for some (p, q), then it is strong 
when it works for every (p', q') such that p' ≥ p and q' ≥ q.  
To explore these conditions further, recall that 
p(a11 – a12) + q(a21 – a22) ≥ a21 – a12,  (1) 
which we called the Inducement Condition for Row, is a necessary condition for 
inducement.  Assume that (R1) and (R2) hold, and note that, together, they imply that   
a21 > a22, and therefore that the coefficient of q in the inducement condition is positive.  It 
is then easy to verify that (1) holds for (p, q) with p = 1 and q ≥ q1 where .  
Note also that 0 < q1  ≤ 1.   
Similarly, it can be shown that (1) holds for (p, q) with p = 0 and q ≥ q0 where 
.  The boundary that separates the values of (p, q) satisfying (1) from those 
values where (1) fails is the straight line joining (0, q0) and (1, q1).  This line is shown in 
each panel of Figure 3.  Observe that q0 > 1 in Figure 3(a) and q0  < 0 in Figure 3(d).  
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Clearly, it is always the case that, if inducement is possible for (p, q), then it is also 
possible for every (p, q') such that q' ≥ q. 
It is apparent from Figure 3 that weak inducibility fails in case 3(d), which arises 
whenever q0 ≤ 0, or    
 a12 ≥ a21. 
Thus, a necessary condition for weak inducibility is  
 a21 > a12. (R3) 
Put another way, (R3) means that CC can be stabilized using probabilistic tit-for-tat with 
the poorest possible detector.  It is easy to verify that (R3) holds iff q0 ≥ 0, which is true 
in cases 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c).   
Figure 3(c) also shows that even when (R3) holds, it is possible for inducement to 
succeed with a (p, q) detector but fail with (p', q) detector where p' > p.  This means that 
inducibility is weak but not strong.  This case occurs whenever the straight line 
separating the region where inducement succeeds (above) and the region where it fails 
(below) has a positive slope, as in Figure 3(c). 
Recall that (R1) and (R2) imply that a21 > a22 and, therefore, that the coefficient of q 
in (1) is positive.  Differentiating (1) implicitly demonstrates that the slope of this straight 
line is .   It follows that the separating line has a nonpositive slope iff  
 a11 ≥ a12, (R4) 
which is a necessary condition for strong inducibility. 
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Because of (R1) and (R2), (R4) implies (R3).  Thus, strong inducibility implies 
weak inducibility.  In summary, weak inducibility occurs if (R1) – (R3) hold, and strong 
inducibility occurs if (R1) – (R4) hold.  Strong inducibility occurs in cases 3(a) and 3(b), 
and weak inducibility in cases 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c).   
In 2 2 strict ordinal games, Row can be weakly induced to choose C iff  
a21 > a11 > a22  and  a21 > a12 
and strongly induced to choose C iff 
a21 > a11 > a22  and  a11 > a12. 
In both cases, Row’s maximum payoff must be a21, which, in the absence of probabilistic 
tit-for-tat, would induce Row to depart from CC.  
Finally, there are two cases of strong inducibility that are distinct when Column’s 
detector has a characteristic curve q = f(p).  Assume Column chooses a value of p, say p0, 
and then uses its detector with characteristic (p0, f(p0)), as discussed in section 2 and 
shown in Figure 2.  By superimposing Figure 2 on Figure 3(a), it is clear that some 
characteristic curves may not intersect the (shaded) zone of inducement.  Thus, in Figure 
3(a), which occurs when a21 > a11 > a22  > a12 (and is equivalent to q0 > 1), it may be 
impossible to select detector characteristics so as to achieve inducement.  
 In this case, inducement is said to be not guaranteed.  Of course, probabilistic tit-
for-tat with a good enough detector, for which f(p) is close enough to 1, will succeed, and 
inducement will be strong.   
The situation is different for Figure 3(b), which occurs when a21 > a11 > a12  > a22, 
In this case, it is clear that, by superimposing Figure 2 on Figure 3(b), it is always 
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possible to select some p0 so that (p0, f(p0)) lies in the zone of inducement in the upper left 
of Figure 3(b).  Note that Figure 3(b) corresponds to q1 ≤ q0 ≤ 1, for which inducement is 
said to be guaranteed.  The games for which there is this guarantee are #7, #8, #9, #10, 
#13, and #14. 
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Figure 1 
2 2 Game in Which Each Player Can Cooperate (C) or Defect (D) 
                  Column 
 CC DC 
          CR (a11, b11) (a12, b12) 
Row     
DR (a21, b21) (a22, b22) 
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Figure 2 
Characteristic Curve for an Imperfect Detector 
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Figure 3 
Region in (p, q) Unit Square where Inducement Can Occur (Four Cases) 
 
Note 
Weak and strong inducement are defined in both the text and the Appendix.   
Guaranteed and not guaranteed are defined in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4 
Three Payoff Configurations for Column, and Eight for Row, of  
24 Potentially Inducible Games 
 
  Row 
Configurations 
 
Column 
Configurations 
3, 2 
4, 1 
3, 1 
4, 2 
2, 3 
4, 1 
4, 3 
2, 1 
(3,4)   (2,3)       #50d 
(4,2)   (1,1) 
(3,4)   (1,3)       #35d 
(4,2)   (1,2) 
(2,4)   (3,3)        #56 
(4,2)   (1,1) 
4, 3 
1, 2 
(3,4)   (2,3)       #29d 
(4,1)   (1,2) 
(3,4)   (1,3)       #28d 
(4,1)   (2,2) 
(2,4)   (3,3)        #47 
(4,1)   (1,2) 
4, 2 
3, 1 
(3,4)   (2,2)        #37 
(4,3)    (1,1) 
(3,4)   (1,2)        #33 
(4,3)   (2,1) 
(2,4)   (3,2)        #39 
(4,3)   (1,1) 
4, 2 
1, 3 
(3,4)   (2,2)       #31d 
(4,1)   (1,3) 
(3,4)   (1,2)       #27d 
(4,1)   (2,3) 
(2,4)   (3,2)        #45 
(4,1)   (1,3) 
4, 1 
3, 2 
(3,4)   (2,1)        #36 
(4,3)   (1,2) 
(3,4)   (1,1)        #34 
(4,3)   (2,2) 
(2,4)   (3,1)        #38 
(4,3)   (1,2) 
4, 1 
2, 3 
(3,4)   (2,1)       #46d 
(4,2)   (1,3) 
(3,4)   (1,1)       #48d 
(4,2)   (2,3) 
(2,4)   (3,1)       #43 
(4,2)   (1,3) 
3, 4 
2, 1 
(3,3)   (2,4)     #57*d 
(4,2)   (1,1)         Ch 
(3,3)   (1,4)       #22i 
(4,2)   (2,1) 
(2,3)   (3,4)      #53* 
(4,2)   (1,1) 
3, 4 
1, 2 
(3,3)   (2,4)     #22*d 
(4,1)   (1,2) 
(3,3)   (1,4)       #32d 
(4,1)   (2,2)         PD 
(2,3)   (3,4)      #20* 
(4,1)   (1,2) 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1.  Rankings of the payoffs to the players are as follows: 4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next 
worst; 1 = worst. 
2.  The numbers (#) of each game are those in the Appendices of Brams (1994, 2011). 
3.  Games #32 (Prisoners’ Dilemma) and #57 (Chicken), the only symmetric games, are 
identified by PD and Ch, respectively. 
4.  Game #22i is obtained by interchanging Column and Row in game #22.  
5.  The inducible outcomes in all 24 games are those in the upper left, wherein Column is 
the inducer. 
6.  Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are underscored. 
7.  The four games with Nash equilibria that are better for Column than the inducible 
outcomes have an asterisk (*) after their numbers. 
8.  The 11 difficult games (see section 5) have a superscript ‘d’ after their numbers.  
9.  The eight games in the right-hand column are weakly but not strongly inducible; the 
remaining 16 games are weakly and strongly inducible. 
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Figure 5 
20 Inducible Games and Column’s Threshold Detection Probability (p0) 
10 Difficult Games 
Class 1 (4 games) 
       1 (27)                              2 (28)                               3 (32)                              4 (48) 
                                                                           Prisoners’ Dilemma 
(3,4)	   (1,2)	   	   (3,4)	   (1,3)	   	   (3,3)	   (1,4)	   	   (3,4)	   (1,1)	  	  	  (4,1)	   (2,3)	   	   (4,1)	   (2,2)	   	   (4,1)	   (2,2)	   	   (4,2)	   (2,3)	  
      p0 = ¾                             p0 = ¾                              p0  = ¾                               p0 = ¾   
                                         
Class 2 (3 games) 
       5 (22i)                              6 (35)                              7 (50)                                
                                                                                                                              
(3,3)	   (1,4)	   	   (3,4)	   (1,3)	   	   (3,4)	   (2,3)	  	  (4,2)	   (2,1)	   	   (4,2)	   (2,1)	   	   (4,2)	   (1,1)	  
      p0 = ½                              p0 = ¾                              p0 = ½  
Class 3 (3 games) 
 
       8 (29)                               9 (31)                             10 (46)                               
(3,4)	   (2,3)	   	   (3,4)	   (2,2)	   	   (3,4)	   (2,1)	  (4,1)	   (1,2)	   	   (4,1)	   (1,3)	   	   (4,2)	   (1,3)	  
      p0 = ½                              p0 = ½                              p0 = ½  
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Figure 5 (cont.) 
20 Inducible Games and Column’s Threshold Detection Probability (p0) 
10 Other Games 
Class 4 (4 games) 
       11 (33)                            12 (34)                             13 (36)                             14 (37) 
                                                                                                                             
(3,4)	   (1,2)	   	   (3,4)	   (1,1)	   	   (3,4)	   (2,1)	   	   (3,4)	   (2,2)	  	  	  (4,3)	   (2,1)	   	   (4,3)	   (2,2)	   	   (4,3)	   (1,2)	   	   (4,3)	   (1,1)	  
      p0 = ¾                              p0 = ¾                             p0 = ½                              p0 = ½                     
 
Class 5 (6 games) 
      15 (38)                            16 (39)                             17 (43)                             18 (45) 
                                                                                                                             
(2,4)	   (3,1)	   	   (2,4)	   (3,2)	   	   (2,4)	   (3,1)	   	   (2,4)	   (3,2)	  	  	  (4,3)	   (1,2)	   	   (4,3)	   (1,1)	   	   (4,2)	   (1,3)	   	   (4,1)	   (1,3)	  
    p0 = ½  W                       p0 = ½  W                         p0 = ½  W                        p0 = ½  W 
      19 (47)                           20 (56) 
(2,4)	   (3,3)	   	   (2,4)	   (3,3)	  (4,1)	   (1,2)	   	   (4,2)	   (1,1)	  
    p0  = ½ W                        p0 = ½  W  
 
Notes 
 
1.  Rankings of the payoffs to the players are as follows: 4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next 
worst; 1 = worst. 
2.  The numbers (in parentheses of each game are those in the Appendices of Brams 
(1994, 2011). 
3.  Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are underscored. 
4.  Weakly inducible games are denoted by the letter ‘W.’  
5.  Inducible outcomes are in boldface at the upper left. 
6.  For each game, the probability p0 is the threshold value above which Column can 
induce Row to cooperate. 
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Figure 6 
 
Iran-Israel Conflict: Two Games Wherein Iran Chooses to Develop (D) or Not 
Develop ( ) Nuclear Weapons and Israel Chooses to Attack (A) or Not Attack ( ) 
 
 
             Figure 6a: Game 1 (27)                                               Figure 6b: Game 24 
 
                                   Israel                                                                           Israel                                                                                           
	   	   A	   	   	   	   A	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   (3,4)	   (1,2)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   (2,4)	   (1,2)	  
Iran	   	   	   	   Iran	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  D	   (4,1)	   (2,3)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  D	   (4,1)	   (3,3)	  
       
                         p0 = ¾  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1.  Rankings of the payoffs to the players are as follows: 4 = best; 3 = next best; 2 = next 
worst; 1 = worst. 
2.  Game 1 in Figure 6a refers to this game in Figure 5.  The number that follows in 
parentheses in Figure 5a (27), and the number given for the game in Figure 6b (24), are 
those in the Appendices of Brams (1994, 2011). 
3.  Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are underscored. 
4.  The inducible outcome in game 1 in Figure 6a is shown in boldface in the upper left. 
5.  The probability (p0) for game 1 (27) is the threshold value above which Israel can 
induce Iran to choose . 
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